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1. Overview 
1.1. Policy Issues 
This National Report describes the current tax privacy protections that apply to 
taxpayers in the United States and provides an overview of the policy considera-
tions that have contributed to their enactment.  The debate over whether tax privacy 
promotes individual tax compliance in the United States is as old as the income tax 
itself.1 In 1862, when Congress first instituted the income tax to pay for the Civil 
War, it required the names of taxpayers and their tax liabilities to be to be open to 
public inspection.2 Since then, Congress has repealed,3 enacted,4 and repealed 
again5 similar measures, each time after vigorous discussion of the relationship be-
tween tax privacy and individual tax compliance. Today, tax privacy rules prohibit 
the US federal government from publicly releasing the details of any specific tax-
payer’s tax return or audit history unless the taxpayer consents.6 But debate over 
this question resurfaces often,7 especially when the government seeks innovative 
ways to address the “tax gap,” or the difference between the amount of tax that tax-
payers should pay and the amount that they actually pay voluntarily and on time, 
which was estimated at USD 345 billion annually in 2006.8 
Defenders of tax privacy have long contended that it encourages individual tax 
compliance because, without it, taxpayers would limit the information that they 
disclose to the government. Because the individual tax return contains so much 
sensitive personal information, defenders of tax privacy suggest that taxpayers 
might feel vulnerable to embarrassment or harassment if others could view it.9 As a 
result, many defenders of tax privacy have speculated that individual taxpayers will 
                                                          
1 As Boris Bittker commented in 1981, this question “was not invented yesterday.” Boris I. 
Bittker, Federal Income Tax Returns—Confidentiality vs. Public Disclosure, Washburn 
L.J. 20, 1981 479, 480–81.  
2  Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 15, 19, 12 Stat. 432, 437, 439 (repealed 1870). Congress 
actually passed the first income tax in 1861, though it went into effect in January 1862 and 
was repealed later that year before any taxes were collected. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 
§ 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (repealed 1862).   
3  Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 11, 16 Stat. 256, 259. 
4 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 680, 698 (repealed 1935). 
5  Act of Apr. 19, 1935, ch. 74, 49 Stat. 158, 158–59. 
6  I.R.C. §§ 6103(a), (b)(2), (c) (2006). 
7  See, e.g., Anna Bernasek, Should Tax Bills Be Public Information?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 
2010, at BU11. 
8  Office of Tax Pol’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, A Comprehensive Strategy for Reducing 
the Tax Gap 5–6 (2006). 
9 See, e.g., 79 Cong. Rec. 2594 (1935) (statement of Rep. Alfred Beiter). 
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comply with the tax system only if they trust that their personal tax information 
“stops with the government.”10 
The contemporary tax-compliance literature, however, reveals palpable scepti-
cism toward the taxpayer-trust theory of tax privacy. Many scholars have ques-
tioned the hypothesis that, in the absence of tax privacy, individuals would with-
hold important personal information from the IRS.11 Several of these scholars have 
suggested that tax privacy no longer plays as critical a role in fostering tax compli-
ance as it did in the past.12 By lifting the curtain of tax privacy, these scholars argue 
that public access to tax return information would cast “[m]illions of eyes”13 on tax 
returns, serving as an “automatic enforcement device.”14 
For over 150 years, the tax privacy debate has followed familiar patterns. Be-
cause neither side has offered a convincing prediction of taxpayers’ reactions to the 
threat of public disclosure of their tax returns, the question of whether tax privacy 
promotes individual tax compliance has swung back and forth between these two 
sides. Both sides have fixated on the question of how a taxpayer would comply 
with the tax system if she knew other taxpayers could see her personal tax return. 
Neither side, however, has addressed the converse question: How would seeing 
other taxpayers’ returns affect whether a taxpayer complies? 
This Report probes that unexplored question and, in doing so, offers a new de-
fence of individual tax privacy: that tax privacy enables the government to influ-
ence individuals’ perceptions of its tax-enforcement capabilities by publicizing 
                                                          
10  Office of Tax Policy, Dep’t of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on Scope and Use of 
Taxpayer Confidentiality and Disclosure Provisions 1, 2000, 19 (attributing the quote to 
Andrew Mellon). 
11  See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Infor-
mation Increase Compliance?, Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 18, 2005,  95, 113 (proposing 
the enactment of a modern-day “pink slip” statute for the public disclosure of some tax in-
formation); Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost’ for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Igno-
rance Along the Publicity–Privacy Continuum, N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 18, 1990, 
951 (proposing the publication of millionaires’ tax returns); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer 
Privacy and Tax Compliance, U. Kan. L. Rev. 51, 2003,  1065, 1120–43 (proposing addi-
tional disclosure exceptions to I.R.C. § 6103); Paul Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 
Nat’l Tax J. 61, 2008, 883, 895–96 (arguing that, due to the wide availability of infor-
mation about individuals, tax privacy laws’ effects are generally reduced); Joseph J. 
Thorndike, Show Us the Money, Tax Notes 123, 2009, 148, 148–49 (arguing for public 
access to individual taxpayers’ tax returns); Joseph J. Thorndike, The Thorndike Chal-
lenge, Tax Notes 122, 2009,  691, 691–92 (arguing for the release of politicians’ tax re-
turns); Bernasek, supra note 7 (quoting Professor Laurence J. Kotlikoff as saying that 
“[d]isclosure could be an automatic enforcement device”. 
12  See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 101–03; Schwartz, supra note 11, at 895–96; 
Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 11, at 691. 
13  Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 11, at 691. 
14  Bernasek, supra note 7 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Professor Kotlikoff’s 
statement). 
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specific examples of its tax-enforcement strengths without exposing specific exam-
ples of its tax-enforcement weaknesses. The government publicizes specific exam-
ples whenever it reveals the details of any named individual’s tax controversy.15 
Because salient examples may implicate well-known cognitive biases, this strategic 
publicity function of tax privacy can cause individuals to develop an inflated per-
ception of the government’s ability to detect tax offenses, punish their perpetrators, 
and compel all but a few outliers to comply. Without the curtain of tax privacy, by 
contrast, individuals could see specific examples of the government’s tax-
enforcement weaknesses that would contradict this perception. After considering 
this new defence of individual tax privacy in the context of deterrence and reciproc-
ity models of taxpayer behaviour, this Report argues that the strategic publicity 
function of tax privacy likely encourages individuals to report their taxes properly 
and that it should be exploited to enhance voluntary compliance. 
The remainder of this Report proceeds as follows:  Parts 1(b) and (c) provide 
an overview of the historical development of tax privacy rules in the United States 
and the current law.  Part 2 describes the ways in which the IRS receives data re-
garding taxpayers’ tax liabilities.  Part 3 describes special information-sharing rela-
tionships between the IRS and particular institutions and individuals, including 
banks and lawyers.  Part 4 describes the ways in which the IRS shares information 
with other government agencies at both the federal and state levels.  Part 5 de-
scribes the ways in which the IRS shares information with the taxing authorities of 
other countries.  Part 6 describes the tax return information that is accessible, and 
inaccessible, by the public under current law.  In presenting this contrast, Part 6 
reveals how tax privacy in the United States enables the IRS to publicize its tax 
enforcement strengths strategically.  Part 7 describes private letter rulings and other 
special agreements between the IRS and specific taxpayers and public access to 
these arrangements.  Finally, Part 8 discusses the consequences of infringement of 
tax privacy rules and illustrates these rules by applying them to a series of hypo-
thetical situations. 
 
1.2. Historical development 
Proposals to make all or a portion of individual income tax returns publicly acces-
sible have appeared frequently throughout the history of the United States, particu-
larly when the government has sought innovative ways to collect tax revenue more 
effectively. Debate over these proposals always addresses the question of whether 
tax privacy causes individuals to be more or less likely to comply with the tax sys-
tem. This part reviews the evolution of tax privacy from the Civil War to the pre-
sent, summarizes the traditional justification for tax privacy as a means of encour-
                                                          
15  See Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, Va. Tax 
Rev. 30, 2010,  1, 8. 
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aging individual tax compliance, and describes—then critiques—recent opposition 
to the traditional justification. 
Public access to individual tax return information in the United States has fluc-
tuated widely over time, ranging from broad accessibility when the income tax was 
first introduced16 to the extensive restrictions on public disclosure that are in effect 
today.17 
The Civil War. As the financial costs of the Civil War mounted and borrowing 
became an unsustainable source of funding,18 Congress enacted the nation’s first 
income tax in 186119 and added public access provisions in 1862.20 Soon after cre-
ating the new tax system, Congress required the Commissioner to permit public 
inspection of complete tax returns and the “proceedings of the assessors.”21 
Within the next two years, major newspapers began publishing the details of 
individuals’ tax returns. By 1865 the New York Times regularly published a front-
page feature titled Our Internal Revenue, which listed the income tax liabilities of 
prominent New Yorkers.22 A July 8, 1865 feature, for example, listed the tax lia-
bilities of rich and famous citizens such as William B. Astor (USD 1.3 million), 
Cornelius Vanderbilt (USD 576,551), and Samuel Lord (USD 183,630).23 The pa-
per’s editors noted that they chose to publish only information that was “not a 
source of annoyance to the parties concerned,” rather than publishing entire income 
tax returns “for the gratification of an idle or morbid curiosity.”24 
In just a few years, however, public support for the income tax waned and so 
too did support for making returns public. Congress prohibited the publication of 
                                                          
16  See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 15, 19, 12 Stat. 432, 437, 439 (repealed 1870). 
17  I.R.C. § 6103 (2006). For detailed discussion of the history of public access to tax returns, 
see Howard M. Zaritsky, Cong. Research Serv., HJ5001A, Legislative History of Tax Re-
turn Confidentiality: Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and Its Predeces-
sors (1974) supra note 9; Privacy Protection Study Comm’n, The Citizen as Taxpayer 1–3, 
25–28, 54 (1977); and Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax 
Data: Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 Cap. U. L. Rev. 373, 378–405 (1993); 
Schwartz, supra note 11, at 884–87. 
18  See Zaritsky, supra note 17, at 3; John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Fed-
eral Income Tax 67 (1985). 
19  Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (repealed 1862). 
20  Act of July 1, 1862 §§ 15, 19. 
21  Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 19, 13 Stat. 223, 228. 
22  See, e.g., Our Internal Revenue: The Eighth Collection District and Its Official Lists, N.Y. 
Times, July 11, 1865, at 1; Our Internal Revenue: The Fifth Collection District in Full, 
N.Y. Times, July 16, 1865, at 5; Our Internal Revenue: The Sixth Collection District in 
Full, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1865, at 5; Our Internal Revenue: The Third (Brooklyn) District 
Complete, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1865, at 1. 
23  Our Internal Revenue: The Sixth Collection District in Full, supra note 22, at 5.  
24  Our Internal Revenue: The Sixth Collection District in Full, supra note 22, at 5. 
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income tax return information in 1870,25 just before repeal of the income tax it-
self.26 
Early Twentieth Century. The issue of tax privacy next arose in the early twen-
tieth century, shortly after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified to authorize an 
income tax.27 In 1913 Congress instructed that all tax returns would be open to pub-
lic inspection, subject to an order of the President under rules prescribed by the 
Treasury Secretary.28 In 1924 progressive US Senators expanded public access by 
spearheading legislation that permitted the public to view the amount of income tax 
paid by every taxpayer.29 
Throughout late 1924 and much of 1925, individuals’ tax return information 
received extensive coverage in the press. After months of anticipation,30 on 24 Oc-
tober 1924—the day after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue released the tax 
lists—the New York Times published a front-page article titled, in large, bold let-
ters, INCOME TAX RETURNS MADE PUBLIC; J.D. ROCKEFELLER JR. PAID $ 
7,435,169 and subtitled Anyone Who Calls at Collector’s Office May See the Re-
turns Made for 1923.31 The article reported on the tax liabilities of prominent citi-
zens, including Rockefeller, Henry Ford, J. P. Morgan, and Charles M. Schwab.32 
On the next day, the Chicago Daily Tribune published an article, titled Movie Sala-
ry Lists Revealed by Tax Payment,33 that included estimates of the taxable incomes 
of Hollywood icons, including Douglas Fairbanks, Charlie Chaplin, and Gloria 
Swanson.34 In noting the low taxable incomes of certain well-known actors,35 the 
                                                          
25 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 11, 16 Stat. 256, 259. Congress reaffirmed this prohibition 
when it later reinstated the income tax in 1894. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 
Stat. 509, 557–59. 
26 Act of July 14, 1870 § 6 (providing that the income tax would expire in 1872). 
27 US Const. amend. XVI. 
28 Act of Oct. 8, 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(d), 38 Stat. 114, 177. 
29 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 257(b), 43 Stat. 253, 293; see also Mark Leff, The Limits 
of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and Taxation, 1933–1939, at 67 (1984) (describing 
the legislative policies behind the 1924 Act). 
30 See, e.g., W. M. Kiplinger, New “Peeping Tom” Law Worries the Taxpayer, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 17, 1924, at 6 (anticipating the coming law publicizing tax information). 
31 Income Tax Returns Made Public; J. D. Rockefeller Jr. Paid $7,435,169; Ford Family and 
Company Pay $19,000,000, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1924, at 1. 
32 Id.; accord Income Revelation Stirs Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1924, at 1 (canvass-
ing the reactions of various citizens upon the publication of taxpayer information); New 
York—Its Big Income, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1924, at 2 (listing a variety of New Yorkers’ 
tax information). 
33 Movie Salary Lists Revealed by Tax Payment, Chi. Daily Trib., Oct. 25, 1924, at 3. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. (noting the 1923 salaries of Cecil B. De Mille—USD 741—and Eric von Stroheim—
USD 321—among others). 
6 Vorname Name des nächsten Beiträgers  
article predicted that “[t]he returns may prove a sharp shock to those who in the 
past have listened to tales by press agents on the salaries of the various stars.”36 
The Treasury Department, headed by Secretary Andrew Mellon (who paid the 
most income tax of Pittsburgh residents in 1923),37 and President Calvin Coolidge 
vigorously opposed the publication of tax return information.38 Amid their persis-
tent lobbying efforts, in February of 1926, Congress enacted a new statute that re-
quired the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make public lists of names and 
addresses, but not the tax liabilities, of all persons who filed income tax returns.39 
The Pink-Slip Requirement. The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great De-
pression caused Congress to consider public access to income tax returns once 
again, this time as a way to prevent tax evasion and the exploitation of tax loop-
holes.40 
While the Senate again passed legislation that would have allowed for the pub-
lication of tax returns in full,41 the legislative compromise in 1934 was a single 
sheet of paper known as the “pink slip.”42 As a result of the 1934 legislation, each 
taxpayer was required to attach to her annual federal income tax return a pink sheet 
of paper that contained her name and address, total gross income, total deductions, 
net income, total credits, and tax liability.43 The pink slip, and not the entire tax 
return, would be open to public inspection.44 
Opposition to the pink-slip requirement was fierce. In early 1935 a conserva-
tive group called the “Sentinels of the Republic” launched a campaign to repeal the 
law.45 Opponents warned repeatedly that the pink-slip requirement would aid kid-
nappers.46 At the same time, the nation’s citizens were mesmerized by the trial of 
Bruno Hauptmann, who was charged with the kidnapping and murder of the infant 
                                                          
36 Id. In 1925, the US Supreme Court upheld the public access law in the face of a statutory 
challenge. United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378, 385–86 (1925). 
37 Movie Salary Lists Revealed by Tax Payment, supra note 33, at 2 (reporting Mellon’s tax 
paid for 1923 as USD 1,173,987). 
38 See Revenue Revision, 1925: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th 
Cong. 8–9, 107 (1925) (statements of Andrew W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, and 
M. L. Seidman, Member, New York Board of Trade and Transportation). 
39 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 257(e), 44 Stat. 9, 51 (amended 1934). 
40 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law: How a “Common 
Man” Campaign Ended a Rich Man’s Law, Law & Contemp. Probs. 73, 2010, 123, 129–
30. 
41 See Leff, supra note 29, at 67–68. 
42 Kornhauser, supra note 40, at 130 (explaining the publicity provision of the Revenue Act 
of 1934 § 55(b)). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See Kornhauser, supra note 40, at 135–38; Raymond Pitcairn, The Pink-Slip Strike, Satur-
day Evening Post, 8 June 1935, at 23, 44. 
46 See 79 Cong. Rec. 2594 (1935) (statement of Rep. Alfred Beiter); Kornhauser, supra note 
40, at 140–41; Income Publicity Called Kidnap Aid, N.Y. Times, 25 Feb. 1935, at 2. 
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son of famous aviators Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh.47 After a surge of 
public outcry, Congress repealed the law in April 193548 before it went into full 
effect.49 
The Nixon Administration. Congress did not revisit the issue of public access to 
tax return information until the years immediately following impeachment proceed-
ings against President Richard M. Nixon. In its articles of impeachment, the House 
Judiciary Committee charged that President Nixon had sought to use the IRS—and, 
specifically, tax return information—for illegal ends.50 According to the Commit-
tee, the Nixon Administration regularly requested tax return information regarding 
specific individuals, including then-Governor George Wallace and the head of the 
Democratic National Committee.  The impeachment proceedings51 and subsequent-
ly released audio recordings52 exposed President Nixon’s personal requests for tax 
audits of political opponents, their supporters, and other members of Nixon’s “en-
emies list,”53 though the Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to comply.54 
 
1.3. General legal framework 
As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,55 which responded to abuses that oc-
curred during the Nixon administration,56 current US tax law contains a general 
presumption that tax return information and tax returns are confidential and may 
not be disclosed by the IRS or other federal and state employees except under cer-
tain circumstances.57  
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code protects the confidentiality of “re-
turns” and “return information.” These concepts are defined broadly.  Under the 
                                                          
47 See Lloyd C. Gardner, The Case that Never Dies: The Lindbergh Kidnapping 2–3 (2004); 
Kornhauser, supra note 40, at 140–41. 
48 Act of Apr. 19, 1935, ch. 74, 49 Stat. 158. 
49 See Kornhauser, supra note 40, at 129. 
50 H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United 
States, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1305, at 3 (1974). 
51 Id. 
52 E.g., Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House 369 (2002) (quoting an 
audio recording of President Nixon stating, “Are we going after their tax returns? . . . Do 
you know what I mean? . . . And on the IRS, you could—are we looking into Muskie’s re-
turn? . . . Hubert? Hubert’s been in a lot of funny deals” (third alteration in original) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
53 Bob Kuttner, Dean Tells of Nixon Pressure on IRS, Wash. Post, 19 July 1974, at A9. 
54 See Patricia Sullivan, IRS Chief Successfully Fought Efforts to Use Tax Audits Against 
Nixon Foes, Wash. Post, 6 Feb. 2009, at B6.   
55 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
56 See IRS, Dep’t of the Treasury, Pub. No. 4638, Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference 
Guide 1-7 to 1-9 (2007). 
57 I.R.C. § 6103(a).   
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statute, for example, “return information” is defined to include “a taxpayer’s identi-
ty, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, ex-
emptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficien-
cies, over assessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, 
or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or any other 
data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the [Inter-
nal Revenue Service] with respect to a return or with respect to the determination 
of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any 
person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposi-
tion, or offense.”58  The confidentiality rules of Section 6103 also extend to any 
amendments filed with the IRS;59 and any taxpayer’s identity, income, tax deduc-
tions and credits, or audit and penalty history, among many other items.60  
Section 6103 provides that its confidentiality protections do not extend to sta-
tistics that cannot be associated with a particular taxpayer.61  As a result, research-
ers in the United States may be permitted to access statistical information regarding 
the number of tax returns filed, total tax collected and aggregate value of tax penal-
ties imposed by the IRS.  It is not possible under the Freedom of Information Act, 
however, for individuals to request tax return information regarding a particular 
taxpayer.62 
 
2. Collection of Data 
2.1. How is data collected? 
The United States relies on “voluntary compliance” to impose and collect the in-
come tax at the federal level.  This phrase refers to the federal government’s reli-
ance on individual taxpayers to calculate, report and pay their tax liabilities correct-
ly and on time with minimal enforcement efforts from the IRS.   
The primary mechanism with which the IRS gathers information regarding in-
dividuals’ tax liabilities is the annual individual tax return.  In the United States, 
every individual who earns gross income in excess of an exemption amount must 
file an annual income tax return with the IRS.63  For the 2012 tax year, the exemp-
tion amount was USD 3,800 for an unmarried individual.64  Income tax returns 
must also be filed by corporations, estates with gross income of USD 600 or more, 
                                                          
58  I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A). 
59 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1). 
60 Id. § 6103(b)(2). 
61 Id. 
62  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 
63  IRC § 6012(a)(1)(A).   
64  IRC § 151(d).  This amount is indexed for inflation each year.  See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2011-
52 (stating personal exemption amount for 2012). 
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trusts with gross income of USD 600 or more, and other entities and organiza-
tions.65 
The IRS also relies heavily on information reports filed by third parties to veri-
fy the tax liability reported by the taxpayers themselves.  For example, every em-
ployer who is engaged in a trade or business which compensates an employee in 
the amount of USD 600 or more (whether in the form of cash or other types of 
payments) for services performed by the employee during the taxable year must file 
an information report with the IRS.66  The employer must also provide this form to 
the employee.67  The IRS uses this information report to verify that the employee 
has reported the correct amount of income on her own individual tax return.  Be-
cause the IRS can use this report to identify any discrepancy between the amount of 
income reported by the employer and the amount reported by the employee, the 
voluntary compliance rate among individuals who are subject to information re-
porting by employers is extraordinarily high.  According to the IRS, for taxpayers 
who earn wages and salaries that are subject to third-party reporting, the amount of 
wages and salary income that is not reported correctly is only about 1%.68  For tax-
payers who earn wages and salary income that is not subject to third-party with-
holding and reporting, however, the amount this is misreported is 56%.69  Infor-
mation reporting extends to many additional taxpayers and transactions other than 
just employers and employees.70 
 Since 1998 the federal government has encouraged, and in some cases, re-
quired, taxpayers to file their tax returns electronically.  While individuals are not 
required to file their annual tax returns electronically, the vast majority of individu-
als currently choose this method of filing.  According to the IRS, approximately 
80% of individual tax returns are filed electronically each year.71  Under current 
law, specified tax return preparers are required to file certain federal income tax 
returns that they prepare and file for individuals, trusts, or estates electronically.72  
In addition, many corporate taxpayers are required to file their tax returns electron-
ically.  Corporations with USD 10 million or more in total assets and that file 250 
                                                          
65  See IRC §§ 6012(a)(2)-(8). 
66  IRS Form W-2. 
67  For instructions, see IRS, General Instructions for Forms W-2 and W-3, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw2w3.pdf. (2013) 
68  IRS, IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates; Compliance Rates Remain Statistically Un-
changed From Previous Study, IR-2012-4, 6 Jan. 2012. 
69  See id. 
70  For discussion of information-reporting rules in the United States, see generally Leandra 
Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Re-
porting Warranted?, Fordham L. Rev. 78, 2010, 1733. 
71  IRS, IRS Urges Tax Professionals to Prepare Now for New e-File Rules, IR-2011-100, 12 
Oct. 2011. 
72  IRC § 6011(e)(3).   
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or more returns a year are required to electronically file their tax returns with the 
IRS.73 
 
2.2. What kind of additional information? 
Individual tax returns contain a significant amount of information other than a tax-
payer’s taxable income.  For example, IRS Form 1040, the annual income tax re-
turn, reveals a taxpayer’s Social Security Number, marital status, names and Social 
Security Numbers of dependents (such as children), receipt of alimony resulting 
from a divorce, receipt of unemployment compensation, existence of outstanding 
student loans, and many other types of personal information.74  This personal in-
formation appears on the individual’s annual tax return because it directly affects 
the calculation of the individual’s taxable income under the income tax laws.  All 
of this information is considered “return information”75 and is protected by the 
broad tax privacy rules discussed earlier. 
 
2.3. Proportionality and other relevant principles 
In many jurisdictions, such as the European Union, principles of proportionality 
play a significant role in determining whether the government can engage in partic-
ular actions to achieve its objectives.  In the United States, the principle of propor-
tionality does not explicitly govern the limits on information that the IRS may col-
lect from taxpayers in order to enforce the tax law. 
 
3. Specific relationships 
3.1. Banks 
The US government has enacted a variety of measures that address financial activi-
ties that occur through banks and other financial institutions.  While the infor-
mation-reporting requirements that affect these institutions and their customers 
could fill volumes, this part briefly describes the major reporting requirements that 
affect financial institutions. 
Investment Income Reporting.  Banks are required to report to the IRS infor-
mation regarding the income that their customers earn in their individual banking 
and checking accounts.  Each January, banks provide to the IRS a report, IRS Form 
1099-INT, which summarizes the interest income paid to their account holders.  
The interest that must be reported includes interest paid by the bank on savings ac-
                                                          
73  Treas. Reg. § 301.6011-5(a). 
74  IRS Form 1040. 
75  IRC § 6103(b)(2)(A). 
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counts, interest-bearing checking accounts and bonds.  Banks provide this form to 
the individual account holders as well, and they use them to complete their annual 
personal tax returns.  Just as the IRS uses information reports from employers to 
verify the income reported by employees, the IRS compares the information reports 
provided by banks with the investment income reported by taxpayers to the IRS.   
Money Laundering Reporting.  Whenever large amounts of money are deposit-
ed to or withdrawn from US bank accounts, banks may be required to report these 
transactions to the IRS.  Under currently law, if more than USD 10,000 is deposited 
to or withdrawn from a bank, the bank may be required to file a “Currency Trans-
action Report” with the IRS.  Several exemptions prevent this reporting require-
ment from applying to certain retail and other customers.   This reporting require-
ment is designed to enable the IRS to detect instances of money laundering and 
other financial crimes.  If the bank is required to file a Currency Transaction Re-
port, it must disclose the identity of the individual involved to the IRS. 
Tax Evasion Reporting.  In order to prevent tax evasion through the use of off-
shore bank accounts, the federal government has also enacted a number of special 
rules that apply to individuals who hold interests in accounts in non-US banks.   
A United States person who holds a financial interest in a non-US bank account 
must file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) if the aggre-
gate value of the foreign financial accounts exceeds USD 10,000 at any time during 
the calendar year.76  If a taxpayer non-wilfully fails to file an FBAR, she can be 
subject to penalty of up to USD 10,000.  If she wilfully fails to file an FBAR, she 
can be subject to a penalty as high as 50% of the value of the non-US account, and 
additional criminal penalties.77  There is no cap on the amount of this penalty. As a 
supplement to the FBAR reporting requirement, US taxpayers are also required to 
file an information return if they hold interests in any “specified foreign financial 
assets,” if the aggregate value of these assets is more than USD 50,000.78   These 
assets include depository accounts in foreign financial institutions, securities or 
stock issued by foreign persons and financial instruments held for investment is-
sued by another person that is not a US person.    
In addition, in 2010, Congress enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA).  Under FATCA, starting in 2014, foreign financial institutions are 
required to report directly to the IRS information about accounts that are held by 
US taxpayers, or that are held by foreign entities in which US taxpayers own sub-
stantial interests.79 If foreign financial institutions do not agree to provide this in-
formation to the IRS, a withholding agent is required to withhold 30% of any 
                                                          
76  TD F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f90221.pdf. (2013) 
77  31 U.S.C. §5321(a)(5). 
78  IRC § 6038D. 
79  IRC §§ 1471-1474. 
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“withholdable payments” made to the foreign financial institution.80  These pay-
ments include US-source income that is fixed is fixed or determinable, annual or 
periodical income (FDAP) or gross proceeds from a sale or redemption of property. 
 
3.2. Lawyers/tax advisors 
Taxpayers are required to file special disclosure statements with the IRS Office of 
Tax Shelter Analysis when they engage in “reportable transactions” during the tax-
able year.81  These transactions include: “listed” transactions (strategies that the 
government considers to be most clearly at odds with congressional intent); “trans-
actions of interest” (arrangements for which the IRS and Treasury Department lack 
enough information to determine whether they should be identified specifically as 
tax avoidance transaction[s]); confidential transactions (where an advisor limits the 
taxpayer’s ability to disclose the tax advice to others); transactions with contractual 
protection (where an advisor promises a refund to the taxpayer if the government 
does not respect the transaction); and loss transactions (which consist of certain 
sales or exchanges of stock, assets, and other property that lead taxpayers to claim 
large losses for tax purposes). 
These disclosure obligations apply not only to the taxpayers who participate in 
the reportable transactions, but also to their lawyers, accountants and other advi-
sors.  If an advisor recommends a reportable transaction in exchange for a mini-
mum fee82 and the taxpayer actually pursues the transaction, the advisor is charac-
terized by the law as a “material advisor.”83  Material advisors must file a disclo-
sure statement with the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis describing the reportable 
transactions they have recommended in exchange for a minimum fee.84 In addition, 
every material advisor must maintain a list of the taxpayers that have caused her to 
be characterized as a material advisor.85  The IRS may request this list at any 
time.86 
 
4. Sharing Information Domestically 
While the US federal tax law contains broad tax privacy provisions in Section 6103 
of the Internal Revenue Code, it also provides a large amount of exceptions under 
                                                          
80  IRC §§ 1471(a). 
81  See Sheryl Stratton, Inside OTSA: A Bird’s-Eye View of Shelter Central at the IRS, Tax 
Notes 100, 2003, 1246, 1246–47. Taxpayers are also required to attach the disclosure 
statement to their annual tax returns. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(e). 
82  Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-3(b)(3)(i)(B) 
83  Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-3(b)(1). 
84  Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6111-3(d)(1), (e). 
85  Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(a). 
86  Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(e). 
 Titel des nächsten Beitrags 13 
which returns and return information may be shared by the IRS with other agencies 
and institutions domestically.87 Many of these exceptions concern tax administra-
tion, such as exceptions that permit the IRS to provide a taxpayer with a copy of his 
own tax return88 or to share return information with state taxing authorities.89 But 
the exceptions implicate non-tax-administration purposes as well.  US federal tax 
law, for instance, allows the IRS to disclose tax return information to other law en-
forcement agencies if the disclosure is relevant to any terrorist incident or threat.90  
As another example, upon the grant of an order by a federal District Court judge or 
magistrate, the IRS may also share an individual’s tax return with law enforcement 
agents for the purpose of assisting them to locate a fugitive from justice.91  
 
5. Sharing Information Internationally 
The IRS shares information with the taxing authorities of other nations pursuant to 
exchange of information provisions contained in tax treaties.  Tax treaties enable 
the United States and its treaty partners to avoid double taxation and also to provide 
information that could enable each nation to enforce the tax law.  As of 2011 the 
United States entered such information sharing arrangements with 90 other juris-
dictions.  During the five-year period between 2006 and 2010, the IRS processed 
5,111 requests for information.  The vast majority of these requests (4,217) were 
incoming requests for information from the taxing authorities of other nations and 
only a small minority (894) of these requests consisted of outgoing requests for in-
formation from the IRS to other taxing authorities.92 
While IRS does not reveal the specific types of information that it shares with 
treaty partners through exchange of information agreements, it has developed pro-
cesses for responding to incoming requests and preparing outgoing requests.93  Un-
der these procedures, all incoming requests to the IRS must contain (i) the identity 
of the US taxpayer who is subject to the inquiry, (ii) an itemized list of all infor-
mation requested, (iii) an explanation of the relevance to the non-US taxing au-
thority of the information requested and (iv) an explanation of how the requested 
information relates to taxes covered by the information sharing agreement.94  IRS 
officials often ask non-US taxing authorities to provide additional information be-
                                                          
87 See id. §§ 6103(c)–(o). 
88 Id. § 6103(c). 
89 Id. § 6103(d). 
90 Id. § 6103(i)(3). 
91  § 6103(i)(5). 
92  See US Gen. Acc. Office, IRS’s Information Exchanges with Other Countries Could Be 
Improved through Better Performance Information, September 2011, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11730.pdf. (2011). 
93  See id. at 8. 
94  See id. 
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fore responding to requests.  When the IRS requests information from the taxing 
authorities of treaty partners, it follows a similar procedure in constructing the re-
quest.  The IRS provides the name and address of the taxpayer under examination, 
the type of tax and tax years at issue, an explanation of how the information relates 
to an investigation by the IRS and the date by which the IRS needs to receive the 
requested information.95 
 
6. Access to Data by the Public 
6.1. Decisions by the tax administration and the courts 
Throughout the past 150 years, the contours of the tax privacy debate in the United 
States have remained remarkably unchanged. Tax privacy advocates speculate that 
individuals would fear embarrassment and other consequences if tax returns were 
publicly accessible. Public-access proponents, by contrast, hypothesize that poten-
tial tax evaders would fear increased chances of IRS detection and social stigma; 
tax privacy advocates refute these claims, and so forth. 
One explanation for the recurrent nature of the tax privacy debate is that its fo-
cus thus far has been incomplete. Both sides have fixated on the question of how 
taxpayers would comply with the tax system if they knew that other taxpayers 
could see their personal tax returns. Neither side, however, has addressed the con-
verse question: How would taxpayers comply with the tax system if they could see 
other taxpayers’ tax returns? 
This part investigates possible answers to that unexplored question. To consid-
er the relationship of tax privacy and individual tax compliance from this new per-
spective, this part performs the following thought experiment: it compares specific 
tax-enforcement examples that individuals see today under current tax privacy rules 
to the specific examples that they could see in a regime in which all tax return in-
formation—including tax returns, liabilities, audit notices, and settlement agree-
ments with the IRS—were publicly accessible.  By comparing a world with tax pri-
vacy to a world without it, this experiment highlights the effects of tax privacy on 
individual taxpayers’ perceptions. 
Why Not Seeing Is Believing.  When the US government describes tax-
enforcement actions against specific taxpayers today, it seeks to portray itself as 
capable of detecting abuse effectively and applying tax penalties, whether civil or 
criminal, aggressively. Because the government has the unilateral power to pursue 
a public tax-enforcement action against a specific taxpayer,96 it plays a unique role 
in promoting strong tax enforcement examples. 
                                                          
95  See id. 
96 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.70 (2011) (granting to the Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Divi-
sion authority to prosecute virtually all civil and criminal proceedings under the internal 
revenue laws). 
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Statistics released by the IRS and other government agencies, however, reveal 
that these examples do not fully represent reality. If we were to lift the curtain of 
tax privacy by making tax return information that is currently confidential—tax 
returns, records of tax-penalty payments, and audit histories, among other items—
open to public inspection, individuals would see many salient examples of weak tax 
enforcement against specific taxpayers that could detract from the perception of the 
government as strong and effective.97 
This part examines the way in which tax privacy filters the specific examples 
of tax enforcement that individuals see—and do not see—and examines their 
potential behavioral effects on individuals due to their perceptions of the 
government’s tax-enforcement capabilities. 
6.1.1. Tax Enforcement Successes That the Public Sees 
By carefully publicizing salient examples of tax-enforcement actions against spe-
cific taxpayers, the government actively attempts to influence individual taxpayers’ 
perceptions of its ability to detect abusive tax activities, levy strong tax penalties 
against offenders and achieve legal victories. The following discussion describes 
the specific examples of strong tax-enforcement actions that individuals see today. 
Detected Abuse.  The government deliberately attempts to raise public aware-
ness of its ability to detect abusive tax activities by showcasing memorable instanc-
es of its detection successes. Salient examples of the government’s detection of the 
abusive tax activities of specific taxpayers may cause individuals to increase their 
subjective probabilities that the government will detect them if they engage in ag-
gressive or abusive tax planning. 
The government pursues public tax-enforcement efforts against specific tax-
payers in part to influence the perceptions of the general public. A former head of 
the IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division acknowledged that the IRS seeks to 
“generate multiple press stories nationwide about particular cases”98 to “de-
ter . . . potential cheaters.”99 To aid its publicity efforts, the Criminal Investigation 
Division assigns dozens of “public information officers” in each of its field offices 
to serve as “the local . . . media contact[s] to provide public record information to 
the media about the field office[s’] cases.”100 Further, government officials have 
                                                          
97 Cf. IRS Oversight Bd., 2010 Taxpayer Attitude Survey 14 (2011), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2011/IRSOB%202010%20Taxpayer%20Attitude%
20Survey.pdf (reporting that 46% of surveyed taxpayers believed the IRS maintained an 
effective balance between enforcement activities and customer service). (2011). 
98 Mark E. Matthews, New IRS Publicity Strategy, US Att’ys’ Bull., July 2001, at 15. 
99 Id. at 16; accord Kristen A. Parillo, Korb: Tax Press Plays Key Role in IRS Communica-
tions Strategy, Tax Notes 118, 2008, 478, 478–79 (describing and quoting similar state-
ments by former IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb). 
100 Jeremiah Coder, Conversations: Eileen Mayer, Tax Notes 116, 2007,  738, 740. 
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revealed that they carefully monitor the “publicity rate,” a measure of the extent to 
which publicly announced civil and criminal tax cases receive press coverage.101 
The media often work in tandem with the government by publicizing the gov-
ernment’s tax-enforcement actions against specific taxpayers, particularly when 
these actions involve criminal sanctions, celebrities, or both. Reporters often print 
descriptions of tax-enforcement actions that they excerpt directly from government 
press releases and announcements.102 The media’s tendency to publicize specific 
tax-enforcement examples peaks reliably during the weeks leading up to Tax Day 
each year.103 
Every year, the government announces specific cases in which it has detected 
taxpayers who have engaged in tax fraud. In addition to issuing its annual “dirty 
dozen” list of tax scams that bear these traits,104 the government provides specific 
examples of taxpayers who have attempted to engage in these strategies and have 
failed to escape detection, including celebrities and other prominent taxpayers. Re-
cent public examples of the government’s successful detection of tax fraud by spe-
cific high-profile individuals include Joe Francis, the creator of the Girls Gone 
Wild videos, who attempted to deduct USD 20 million in phony business expens-
es;105 Richard Hatch, the former star of the reality television show Survivor, who 
attempted to omit his USD 1 million prize and other items from taxable income;106 
and actor Nicolas Cage, who improperly deducted over USD 3 million for meals, 
gifts, and expenses associated with his Gulfstream jet as business expenses.107 
Often the government’s publicly announced tax-enforcement efforts involve 
more sophisticated forms of tax evasion by prominent business figures and other 
wealthy individuals. For example, in April 2010, following its settlement with 
UBS, the Swiss global financial services company, regarding its promotion of off-
shore banking activities, the US Department of Justice Tax Division announced 
separate criminal pleas and civil settlements involving specific former clients of 
                                                          
101 See, e.g., id. 
102 See, e.g., Amy Bonawitz, “Girls Gone Wild” Founder Indicted, CBSNews.com (Feb. 11, 
2009, 5:03 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/11/entertainment/main2673413.shtml (citing 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Creator of Girls Gone Wild Indicted for Tax Evasion 
(Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv07237.htm). 
103 See Blank & Levin, supra note 15, at 18. 
104 See, e.g., Beware of IRS’ 2009 “Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams, IRS (Apr. 13, 2009), 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=206370,00.html. 
105 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 102. 
106 Press Release, US Dep’t of Justice, “Survivor” Winner Richard Hatch Is Sentenced to 51 
Months in Prison for Tax Evasion (May 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/tax/usaopress/2006/txdv06_RH_TaxEvasion.pdf. 
107 Janet Novack & William P. Barrett, Nic Cage’s Other Weekend Premiere: IRS Settlement, 
Forbes.com (Sept. 5, 2008, 3:11 PM), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/05/hollywood-taxes-cage-biz-media-
cz_wb_jn_0905cage.html. 
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UBS on each of the three days up to and including Tax Day, when seven individu-
als were charged on that single day with hiding over USD 100 million in foreign 
bank accounts.108 The government also uses specific examples to publicize its de-
tection of prominent or wealthy individuals who have failed to file required disclo-
sure forms regarding suspicious tax activities with the government. 
Not only does the government publicize specific examples of its detection suc-
cesses, but it also announces them disproportionately during the weeks leading up 
to Tax Day compared to the rest of the year. An empirical study of the US Depart-
ment of Justice Tax Division during the seven-year period from 2003 through 2009 
found that in the two weeks leading up to Tax Day, the government issued more 
than double the number of tax-enforcement press releases per week than it did dur-
ing the rest of the year.109 
The chart below shows a graphic illustration of our findings of the average fre-















                                                          
108 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former UBS Client Pleads Guilty to Hiding Assets in 
Secret Offshore Bank Accounts (Apr. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-tax-401.html; Press Release, Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Seven UBS Clients Charged With Hiding over $100 Million in Secret Swiss Bank 
Accounts to Defraud the IRS (Apr. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv10_USB_Clients.htm; Press Release, Stacey A. Levine & 
Michael C. Vasiliadis, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former UBS Client Pleads Guilty to Failing 
to Report over $1 Million in Swiss Bank Accounts (Apr. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2010/Abrahamsen,%20Harry%20Plea
%20PR.pdf. 
109 Blank & Levin, supra note 15 at 17. For the time window from 1 April to Tax Day, the 
study found that the government issued 128% more tax-enforcement press releases per 
week than during the rest of the year. Id. 
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FIGURE 1 
FREQUENCY OF TAX-ENFORCEMENT PRESS RELEASES (2003–2009)110 
The disproportionately large number of tax-enforcement press releases issued 
during the two weeks prior to Tax Day compared to the rest of the year was highly 
statistically significant.111 In other words, this analysis strongly supported the hy-
pothesis that the difference did not occur by chance. The timing of the govern-
ment’s public announcements of tax-enforcement actions against specific taxpayers 
coincides with the weeks leading up to Tax Day, the time of year when the vast ma-
jority of individual taxpayers are in the process of preparing their own individual 
tax returns.112 
Strong Tax Penalties.  While the Internal Revenue Code contains a myriad of 
tax penalties that apply in varying degrees of severity, the government’s public an-
nouncements and media reports regarding specific taxpayers who have received tax 
penalties almost exclusively involve criminal sanctions or high civil tax penalties. 
These salient examples may lead individuals to overvalue the tax penalties that may 
apply to many tax offenses. 
In the examples of detected abuse described above, not only did the govern-
ment publicly announce its success in catching non-compliant taxpayers, but in 
                                                          
110 Id. at 18. 
111 “The negative binomial regression model’s likelihood ratio chi-square [was] 23.48 . . . .” 
Id. at 16. The p-value was only .0000013. Id. These statistics mean, essentially, that there 
is a one-in-791,637 chance that this difference in the issuance of tax-enforcement press re-
leases was random. Id. 
112 Cf. id. at 13 (“[T]he vast majority of annual individual income tax returns are filed with 
the [IRS] between February 1 and Tax Day each year. In 2008, for example, nearly 80% 
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many cases, it also announced that these taxpayers would face criminal sanctions. 
When the government announces a public tax-enforcement action against a celebri-
ty taxpayer who has engaged in a flagrant omission of taxable income, it frequently 
reveals that the taxpayer could face prison time.113 Similar results occur in public 
tax-enforcement actions against individuals who have used more sophisticated tax-
evasion methods, such as many former UBS clients who used offshore bank ac-
counts to hide income and received prison or probation sentences as a conse-
quence.114 Further, when the government announces that it has detected habitual 
cash-economy tax evaders, it often states its intention to pursue criminal sanc-
tions.115 Consistent with the timing patterns described above, the government’s an-
nouncements of criminal tax sanctions against specific taxpayers occur dispropor-
tionately in the weeks leading up to Tax Day compared to the rest of the year.116 
Tax-Controversy Victories.  Last, the government may publicize its successes 
in both criminal and civil tax litigation to foster the perception that taxpayers have 
a low chance of prevailing in a tax controversy against it. Government officials 
have stated publicly that they believe that government victories in criminal and civ-
il tax controversies “receive wide media coverage” and, as a result, have “a signifi-
cant multiplier effect on voluntary compliance.”117 Consistent with these words, the 
government reinforces the perception that it prevails in most tax controversies by 
publicizing vivid descriptions of its victories against specific taxpayers in criminal 
and civil tax litigation in the public courts. 
The most memorable public tax disputes often involve criminal tax cases 
against specific taxpayers. The Tax Division litigates these cases, and its lawyers 
win almost all of them. In 2009, for example, the government won 98% of all crim-
inal tax controversies that it prosecuted.118 Just two years earlier, this success rate 
was 100%.119 Consequently, when individuals hear about a criminal tax-
enforcement action against a specific taxpayer through news reports or other 
sources, they almost always learn that the taxpayer involved has entered a guilty 
plea or received a criminal sanction, such as a prison sentence.  Even when the 
government loses on the merits on the heftiest criminal charges against a particular 
                                                          
113 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Wesley Snipes Surrenders on Tax Charges (Dec. 
8, 2006), available at media.tbo.com/graphics/120806snipes. 
pdf; Press Release, US Dep’t of Justice, supra note 106. (2006). 
114 For the government’s announcement of UBS clients who have received criminal sentenc-
es, see Offshore Tax-Avoidance and IRS Compliance Efforts, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110092,00.html (last updated 13 Dec. , 2011). 
115 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Rhode Island Machine Shop Owners Convicted 
of Tax Fraud (Mar. 30, 2009). 
116 Blank & Levin, supra note 15, at 18. 
117 Tax Div., US Dep’t of Justice, FY 2011 Congressional Budget 25 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/pdf/fy11-tax-justification.pdf., at 2. (2011). 
118 Id. at 23. 
119 See id. 
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taxpayer, it often succeeds in obtaining a conviction on lesser charges or enters into 
a plea agreement with the taxpayer.120 
6.1.2. Tax Enforcement Weaknesses That the Public Does Not See 
The examples of tax enforcement that are visible today portray the government as 
enforcing the tax law effectively and efficiently. It catches tax cheats, wins in court, 
and ensures that strong punishments for tax non-compliance are levied. Yet these 
examples of successful tax enforcement feature only a tiny sampling of taxpayers. 
Taxpayers in the US cannot see the details of other taxpayers’ tax returns or their 
disputes with the government. They are not visible because tax privacy hides them 
from public view. 
What would the public see in a world without individual tax privacy? To ex-
plore the possibilities, let us imagine a regime of public access in which the tax re-
turn information of individuals that is protected by tax privacy could be viewed by 
the media and the general public. In this hypothetical public-access regime, a tax-
payer’s tax return and related information could be made publicly available in a 
searchable online database, so that the reporters and ordinary citizens could exam-
ine any taxpayer’s tax returns, audit history, settlement agreements, and other tax 
return information. 
As the discussion below reveals, by lifting the curtain of tax privacy, the public 
would see very different examples of tax enforcement involving specific taxpayers 
compared to those we see today. In contrast to the examples the public sees today, a 
public-access regime could enable it to see concrete examples of the government 
failing to detect abusive tax activities, declining to apply tax penalties (whether 
criminal or civil), and offering taxpayers concessions in its substantive legal chal-
lenges. 
Undetected Abuse.  Without the curtain of tax privacy, the media—and ulti-
mately ordinary citizens—could observe concrete examples of taxpayers who may 
have engaged in abusive tax activities, yet escaped detection by the IRS. The me-
dia’s focus on instances in which the IRS appeared to fail to detect abuse could lead 
individuals to reduce their own subjective probabilities of being detected by the 
IRS. 
Despite the government’s dramatic public announcements of its successful de-
tection of tax non-compliance, ranging from blatant tax fraud to sophisticated tax 
shelter activity, publicly available tax-enforcement statistics strongly suggest that 
many taxpayers engage in abusive tax avoidance or tax evasion without prompting 
an IRS audit or other investigation. For example, as a result of the IRS’s limited 
budgetary resources, the audit rate for individual taxpayers perennially hovers 
                                                          
120 See, e.g., Wesley Snipes Gets 3 Years for Not Filing Tax Returns, N.Y. Times, 25 Apr. 
2008, at C3 (noting that the defendant was acquitted of tax fraud but convicted of wilful 
failure to file a federal tax return). 
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around 1% (in 2009, for example, it was 1.03%).121 Other public reports indicate 
that hundreds of thousands of citizens simply fail to file tax returns at all, and the 
IRS lacks the resources to investigate these cases.122 Publicly available statistics 
also reveal that the IRS has reduced its audit coverage of wealthy taxpayers over 
the last decade (for example, by 36% from 2007 to 2008),123 yet studies show that 
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of USD 500,000 to USD 1,000,000 fail to 
accurately report 21% of their income on average.124 Consistent with this data, IRS 
officials have conceded that they do not audit many instances of abuse.125 
Instead of anonymous statistics, the elimination of tax privacy would reveal the 
identities of taxpayers who have engaged in abusive tax planning and whom the 
IRS has failed to pursue. Especially in the case of celebrities and government offi-
cials, public access to tax return information could generate a media frenzy over tax 
returns that appear to show low taxable income compared to these individuals’ ap-
parent wealth or other suspicious items that may imply the use of abusive tax-
planning techniques. Likewise, for curious citizens, public access to tax return in-
formation could offer examples of friends and neighbours who may have claimed 
improper tax positions on their tax returns. 
If individuals were to encounter examples of specific taxpayers who had en-
gaged in abusive tax activities, they may conclude that the IRS has failed to detect 
these instances unless the publicly available tax return information shows other-
wise. Upon discovering a specific taxpayer’s apparent abuse, the media, or even 
ordinary individuals, could review the taxpayer’s publicly available tax return in-
formation to determine whether the IRS had sent the taxpayer an audit letter (a 
“Summary of Proposed Changes”)126 or a statutory notice of deficiency,127 whether 
the taxpayer had filed a protest with the IRS Appeals Division in response to a rev-
enue-agent letter,128 or whether the taxpayer had filed any amended tax returns that 
revised the original abusive tax position. If none of these items were present, then 
                                                          
121 Fiscal Year 2009 Enforcement Results, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/fy_2009_enforcement_results.pdf (last visited 23 Sept. 2011). 
122 See generally David Cay Johnston, Perfectly Legal 204–05 (2003). 
123 See IRS Audit Rate for Millionaires Plummets, TRAC IRS (Mar. 23, 2009), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/latest/204/. (2009). 
124 See, e.g., Andrew Johns & Joel Slemrod, The Distribution of Income Tax Noncompliance, 
63 Nat’l Tax J. 397, 404, 413 (2010). 
125 Johnston, supra note 122, at 200 (quoting Frank Keith, former senior IRS spokesman, as 
stating that, “with limited resources[,] the I.R.S. must often choose which cases to pursue” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
126 CP 2000 Sample Contents Page 1, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=169287,00.html. (2000). 
127 I.R.C. § 6212(a). 
128 See Letters and Notices Offering an Appeal, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=160744,00.html (last updated 25 July 2011) 
(describing IRS Letter 525—General 30 Day Letter). 
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the media’s discovery of a case of abuse involving a specific taxpayer could lead to 
the perception that the IRS had failed to detect this abuse on its own. 
Weak Tax Penalties.  A public-access regime would also likely enable the me-
dia to publicize instances in which tax evaders were detected by the IRS but did not 
bear strong criminal or civil tax penalties. As opposed to the specific examples of 
tax penalties that individuals encounter today, the statutory and administrative ex-
ceptions and standards inherent in these tax-penalty rules prevent the government 
from applying hefty civil or criminal tax penalties in the vast majority of tax con-
troversies. 
The government pursues criminal tax penalties against individual taxpayers in 
a minute number of cases.129 A public-access regime, consequently, would likely 
reveal memorable examples of high-profile individuals who participated in fraudu-
lent tax schemes without facing criminal prosecution. The primary reason for the 
government’s reluctance to seek criminal tax penalties is that it must prove in court 
that the taxpayer intended to defraud the government.130 Thus, one explanation for 
the government’s reluctance to pursue criminal tax sanctions against taxpayers who 
have participated in tax fraud is that the available evidence may not satisfy the 
heightened burden of proof. 
Instead of pursuing criminal tax sanctions in many cases, the government at-
tempts to reach a civil settlement with the taxpayer or even creates special amnesty 
programs that encourage taxpayer disclosure by removing the threat of criminal tax 
penalties. For example, in September 2009, after reaching an exchange-of-
information agreement with UBS,131 the IRS created an amnesty program under 
which taxpayers could voluntarily disclose their use of offshore accounts and, in 
exchange, avoid the imposition of criminal tax-fraud penalties.132 Within weeks of 
the IRS’s announcement of the amnesty program, 15,000 taxpayers participated.133 
Even though some rich and famous individuals probably participated in the amnes-
ty programme, tax privacy prevented the media from reporting their identities.  
With public access to tax return information, however, the media could gener-
ate vivid news stories of recognizable, high-profile taxpayers who engaged in tax 
fraud but avoided the criminal or civil penalties by participating in IRS amnesty 
                                                          
129 See Tax Div., US Dep’t of Justice, FY 2011 Congressional Budget 25 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/pdf/fy11-tax-justification.pdf., at 1, 14, 23, 
25 (discussing the number of authorized criminal prosecutions in given years). (2010). 
130 U.S. Tax Ct. R. Prac. & P. 142(b). 
131 IRS to Receive Unprecedented Amount of Information in UBS Agreement, IRS (Aug. 19, 
2009), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=212124,00.html. (2009). 
132 Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, IRS (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=210027,00.html. The IRS announced a second 
special offshore voluntary disclosure initiative on 8 February 2011. Second Special Vol-
untary Disclosure Initiative Opens, IRS (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=235695,00.html. (2011). 
133 Second Special Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Opens, supra note 132. 
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programs. These examples would stand in stark contrast to the government’s public 
announcements describing the convictions of wealthy and prominent individuals 
who have hidden income from the IRS in offshore bank accounts.  
Tax-Controversy Concessions.  Last, in a public-access regime, the media 
would likely focus on tax controversies in which the government made legal 
concessions or entered settlements to avoid facing uncertain odds in court. 
Reporters would also likely investigate instances in which IRS agents made errors 
in applying the law that were subsequently reversed by other IRS officials. These 
reports would conflict with the strong examples of legal victories against taxpayers 
that the government publicizes widely today. 
Even though the tax disputes involving specific taxpayers that individuals see 
today overwhelmingly feature government victories, in reality, the IRS regularly 
settles tax controversies and reverses the positions of its field agents.134 The IRS 
Appeals Division settles over 85% of all disputes.135 The Appeals Division may 
review a field agent’s notice of deficiency after the taxpayer files an appeal with 
the IRS and determine that the IRS’s legal claim is not strong enough to merit 
litigation in a public forum.136 And as was discussed above, the IRS frequently 
creates taxpayer-amnesty programs in which it agrees not to pursue litigation 
against a taxpayer in exchange for certain information.137  Public access to tax 
return information would enable the media to publicize those examples by 
revealing settlement agreements and instances in which specific taxpayers paid the 
IRS lower amounts than those contained in the original statutory notices of 
deficiency.  
6.1.3. Strategic Publicity and Tax Compliance 
By enabling the government, with the help of the news media, to influence individ-
ual taxpayers’ perceptions of its tax-enforcement capabilities, tax privacy may bol-
ster the government’s deterrence efforts. Because tax privacy allows the govern-
ment to publicize examples of strong tax enforcement against specific taxpayers 
almost exclusively, the government may inflate taxpayers’ perceptions of the two 
principle determinants of deterrence: the probability of detection and the expected 
costs of non-compliance.  Without tax privacy, examples of weak tax enforcement 
against specific taxpayers could surface and have the opposite effect on individu-
als’ perceptions and tax-compliance decisions. 
In addition to enhancing deterrence, the strategic-publicity function of tax pri-
vacy may also enable the government to increase confidence among compliant in-
                                                          
134 See David M. Fogel, The Inside Scoop About the IRS’s Appeals Division, Tax Notes 99, 
2003, 1503, 1503–04 (internal quotation marks omitted), at 1504. 
135 B. John Williams, Jr., Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., Resolving Tax Shelters: By 
Settlement or Litigation, Address Before the Chicago Bar Association Federal Taxation 
Committee (25 Feb. 2003) (on file with author). 
136 See Fogel, supra note 134, at 1503–04. 
137 See, e.g., Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, supra note 132. 
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dividual taxpayers who are motivated by feelings of reciprocity. According to reci-
procity theory, these types of taxpayers will comply with the tax system only if 
they believe that other taxpayers are paying their taxes honestly.  Because tax pri-
vacy primarily causes individuals to see examples of tax enforcement that show the 
government catching tax cheats and subjecting them to harsh punishment, compli-
ant individuals may perceive that few of their fellow taxpayers cheat and that those 
who do face dire consequences. Without tax privacy, visible examples of the gov-
ernment’s failure to detect or penalize non-compliant taxpayers could appear and 
have negative tax-compliance effects on individuals whose voluntary compliance is 
conditional on that of other taxpayers. 
 
6.2. List of taxpayers 
The IRS does not publish lists of taxpayers and their respective tax liabilities.  If a 
taxpayer is involved in a public civil or criminal trial with the government over tax 
matters, the public may learn about the taxpayer’s return information. The govern-
ment currently takes the position that, in these cases, it may publicly disclose in-
formation that has become part of a public court record.138 Further, a taxpayer may 
enter into a civil settlement agreement with the IRS and, as part of the settlement, 
sign a waiver of the tax privacy protections described above.139 And if a taxpayer is 
delinquent in paying federal income taxes, the government may file a Notice of 
Federal Tax Lien on the taxpayer’s property, which publicly notifies the taxpayer’s 
creditors of the government’s claim.140 
At the state level, taxing authorities frequently publish the names of individual 
and business taxpayers are delinquent in paying taxes in excess of a specified 
threshold.  Over half of the states in the United States have published the identities 
of businesses and individuals that have failed to pay outstanding tax liabilities on 
time.  State taxing authorities most commonly use websites to publicize this infor-
mation, such as Maryland’s “Caught in the Web”141 and South Carolina’s “Debt-
or’s Corner.”142  In most states, the mechanics of tax shaming campaigns are rela-
                                                          
138 IRS, supra note 56, at 2-28. Although this issue has been disputed, several courts have 
sided with the government’s position. See, e.g., Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 
337 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing several lower court decisions finding that tax information is no 
longer confidential once disclosed to a court). 
139 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(c)-1(b) (2003), for a description of procedures that the IRS 
must follow in obtaining a waiver. 
140  File a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id= 
108339,00.html#Notice (last updated 19 Dec. 2011). 
141  Comptroller of Maryland, Caught in the Web, available at  
http://compnet.comp.state.md.us/Compliance_Division/Collections/General_Collections_I
nformation/Caught_in_the_Web.Shtml. (2013). 
142  South Carolina Dep’t of Revenue, Debtor’s Corner, at 
http://www.sctax.org/delinquent/delinquent.shtml (last visited 27 Sept. 2009). 
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tively simple.  The state taxing authority identifies taxpayers who owe outstanding 
state tax liability in excess of a threshold amount.  After there is no legal dispute as 
to the amount of outstanding tax liability, the Department of Revenue mails a “No-
tice of Pending Internet Posting” to these taxpayers warning them that if they do 
not make payment, their names and amounts of outstanding tax liabilities will be 
posted on the tax shaming website.143  State revenue agencies report that taxpayers 
have responded positively to the threat of public shaming, as they have paid mil-
lions of dollars in outstanding taxes in recent years. 
 
6.3. Protection of journalist sources in the tax administration and tax 
courts 
While some jurisdictions may provide employees of the taxing authority with legal 
protections when they independently provide tax return information of specific tax-
payers to the press, the United States does not provide such exemptions.  Under 
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, employees of the IRS are prohibited 
from disclosing return information of specific taxpayers to non-authorized individ-
uals, including members of the press.144  However, the IRS may disclose taxpayer 
identity information to the press and other media solely for the purposes of notify-
ing persons entitled to tax refunds when the IRS has been unable to locate such per-
sons after a reasonable lapse of effort and time.145 
 
7. Access to taxpayers’ data by individuals 
There are limited circumstances under which the public may gain access to a spe-
cific taxpayer’s federal tax return information.   
The IRS provides private letter rulings to individual and business taxpayers un-
der certain circumstances.146  A “letter ruling” is a written determination issued to a 
taxpayer by the IRS in response to the taxpayer’s written inquiry, filed prior to the 
filing of its tax return.147  A letter ruling interprets the tax laws and applies them to 
the taxpayer’s specific set of facts.  After the IRS issues a private letter ruling to a 
taxpayer, it publishes the text of this ruling for public inspection.148  When the IRS 
publishes the private letter ruling, however, it redacts all identifying information of 
the taxpayer that requested and received the ruling.  As a result, the public may 
                                                          
143  Wis. Stat. § 73.03(62).  
144  I.R.C. § 6103.   
145  I.R.C. § 6103(m).   
146  For an overview of the procedures related to the request and issuance of private letter rul-
ings, see Internal Revenue Bulletin 2012-1 (Jan. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb13-01.pdf. (2013). 
147  See id. 
148  I.R.C. § 6110. 
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view tax return information of a particular taxpayer, but it will likely be unable to 
determine with certainty the identity of that taxpayer. 
It is also possible for a taxpayer to waive its tax privacy protections under Sec-
tion 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code.  Taxpayers occasionally grant the IRS this 
waiver in connection with the settlement of a significant tax controversy.  During 
the tax shelter crackdown of the mid-2000s, the Chief Counsel of the IRS, Donald 
Korb, commented that when a corporation desired to settle a tax shelter dispute, he 
would “say okay, but as part of the settlement, we’ll put out a press release naming 
you.”149 A press release may press release may describe the corporation’s participa-
tion in an abusive tax shelter and the terms of the settlement, including the tax lia-
bility, penalties, and interest ultimately owed.150  
 
8. Consequences of Infringement 
Individuals who make unauthorized disclosures of returns or return information 
may face civil penalties and criminal penalties of up to five years in prison.151  In 
addition, the Internal Revenue Code prohibits members of the Executive Branch 
from accessing tax return information or attempting to influence taxpayer audits or 
other investigations.152  
The consequences of infringement of tax privacy protections in the United 
States are illustrated through the hypothetical examples set forth below: 
John A is an employee at the national tax administration. One day John is reviewing the 
tax declaration of Steven B, sole proprietor of a locally very popular furniture store, 
Smiling Homes. John discovers that during 2010 Smiling Homes has bought furniture 
from non-European companies known for their intense use of child labour. John decides 
to reveal this information to a local newspaper by sending a copy of Steven’s tax decla-
ration (or a copy of both Steven’s and Smiling Homes’ declaration, if those are kept 
separate in your legal system). The newspaper publishes a series of articles on Steven 
B’s lack of social sensitivity. Steven, in the year following the revelations, experiences a 
sharp decrease in sales, estimated at EUR 500,000. Moreover, Steven and his family are 
regularly harassed by activists picketing in front of their home.  
John A’s act of disclosure may result in the imposition of a criminal prison sen-
tence of up to five years and a criminal fine of up to USD 5,000.153  These conse-
                                                          
149  Donald Korb, The War on Tax Shelters, Speech at NYU School of Law (6 Mar. 2007) 
(discussing IRS approach of releasing press releases regarding tax shelter settlements with 
large corporations) (notes on file with author). 
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quences occur because John A is an officer or employee of the IRS.  Further, under 
the facts presented in this hypothetical, John A appears to have acted “wilfully” in 
disclosing the information regarding Steven’s business practices to a local newspa-
per.  In addition, John A may be liable for civil damages if Steven decides to sue 
John A in US District Court.154  
Carl C is an employee of the national tax administration. On Monday, 1 June 2011, Carl 
receives a call from a police officer demanding that he sends over all the tax documenta-
tion pertaining to Sandra D. The officer explains that Sandra D is suspected of collabo-
ration with terrorists. The requested tax documentation may help the police understand 
Sandra’s economic movements and her business connections. Of interest is also that the 
terrorist group to which Sandra may be connected is, according to intelligence infor-
mation, planning an attack against a political target. Carl complies with the police of-
ficer’s request. After a few months, however, it becomes clear that Sandra D is not con-
nected to a terrorist group and that all her business transactions are conducted with re-
spectable persons. In particular, Sandra works as a translator from English to Arabic. 
Many of Sandra’s clients, however, decide to abandon her after having been contacted 
by the police during the investigation. 
Carl C likely can rely on a special exception in the US federal tax law to avoid 
criminal prosecution or civil liability as a result of the disclosure of Sandra D’s tax 
return information to the law enforcement officer.  The US Congress has enacted a 
special exception to Section 6103, which allows the IRS to disclose tax return in-
formation to other law enforcement agencies if the disclosure is relevant to any ter-
rorist incident or threat.155  Under this provision, the IRS may disclose in writing 
return information that may be related to a terrorist incident, threat, or activity to 
the extent necessary to apprise the head of the appropriate Federal law enforcement 
agency responsible for investigating or responding to such terrorist incident, threat, 
or activity.156 
Amanda F is an employee at Pecunia Bank located in Country A. On 3 May 2011 she is 
approached by a person, Henry G, an agent of Country A’s tax authority, who asks her 
to provide a memory stick containing information on all the bank’s account holders. 
Henry G claims that several citizens of Country B use Pecunia Bank’s accounts to 
screen their tax evasion and that the government of Country B has asked Country A for 
help in order to recover hundreds of millions of euros in taxes. Amanda agrees and 
downloads all the required information on a memory stick that she then gives to Henry 
G. The information is then provided to Country B’s tax authority. 
 Amanda F has not committed a criminal offense under Section 7213 of the Internal 
Revenue Code157 because she is not an officer or employee of the United States.  In 
addition, because the identity of the bank account holders is not “return infor-
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mation” under Section 6103,158 the criminal sanctions that apply to John A above 
are not relevant to Amanda F. 
 
Conclusion 
This Report has provided an overview of tax privacy in the United States.  By ex-
amining the relationship of individual tax privacy and individual tax compliance 
from a new perspective, this Report has offered a new defence of individual tax 
privacy: that tax privacy enables the government to influence individuals’ percep-
tions of its tax-enforcement capabilities by publicizing specific examples of its tax-
enforcement strengths without exposing specific examples of its tax-enforcement 
weaknesses.  The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may facilitate the gov-
ernment’s deterrence efforts by causing individuals to overestimate the govern-
ment’s ability to detect tax avoidance and evasion and to punish non-compliant 
taxpayers. Likewise, it may enable the government to increase confidence among 
compliant taxpayers, enriching feelings of reciprocity by causing them to perceive 
that most people pay their taxes honestly, even if this is not often—or ever—the 
case.  This Report has shown that the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy 
likely encourages individuals to report their taxes properly and it has argued that 
this function should be exploited to enhance voluntary compliance. 
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